The Cuckoo President and the Oligarch
The Cuckoo President and the Oligarch
Has Western liberalism pushed Georgia too far?
The Georgian elections on 26 October will be pivotal in deciding its geopolitical fate, and that of the South Caucasus more generally. Georgia was the original poster-child of Western hegemonic liberalism in the post-Soviet sphere, but over the past year (in particular), the incumbent government has pursued a different line. Has Russia wooed Georgia back, or has the West overextended itself?
Georgia was the most immediately chaotic of the states that claimed independence on the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, suffering both a short-lived civil war, and separatist rebellions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both were semi-autonomous republics in Soviet times, and they control two of the handful of passable routes across the Caucasus range: the Black Sea coast in the case of Abkhazia, and the Roki tunnel into South Ossetia. (The Georgian Military Highway across the Darial pass also runs close by the border.) The situation stabilised with de facto, but unrecognised, independence for both territories under Russian sponsorship; a situation which remains to this day. The rest of Georgia was led by the last foreign minister of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze, who remained in power until November 2003, the first of the colour revolutions (the Rose Revolution) of the former USSR states.
Western penetration into Georgia was significant even under the Shevardnadze government, including widespread foreign-funded NGOs, USAID support and IMF loans. In the run-up to the 2003 revolution, the US and IMF simultaneously cut funding, and both the US ambassador to Georgia, and Secretary of State James Baker called for “democratic transition” and monitored elections. Opposition was led by one of Shevardnadze’s former ministers, Mikheil Saakashvili, who received support from (amongst others) George Soros’ Open Society Initiative.
From Misha to the Cuckoo President
It’s worth a brief detour to follow the extraordinary career of “Misha” Saakashvili. Before entering Georgian politics, Saakashvili had been sponsored by the US State Department to study at Columbia, including at Zbigniew Brzezinski’s School of International and Public Affairs. Staunchly pro-Western, the Saakashvili government introduced liberal economic reforms, privatisations, and even a law capping government spending to 30% of GDP. President George W. Bush visited in 2005; a street in Tbilisi is now named after him.
But these reforms also brought problems: inevitable corruption, expansion of the NGO sector, and an agenda of social liberalisation. Most significantly, Saakashvili overplayed his hand in regard to military relations with Moscow. The Bucharest Summit in 2008 accepted Georgia (along with Ukraine) on the path to NATO membership. Backed by Russia, forces in South Ossetia started shelling Georgian villages. Saakashvili took the bait, and invaded; Russia countered and humiliated the Georgian army in a week. A ceasefire was signed quickly, but Putin had made his point: Western backing without full membership is worth little.
Despite the defeat, Saakashvili remained power until 2012. The new government of the Georgian Dream party (“GD”) led by Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia’s richest man, who made his money in Russia) immediately sought a more accommodating relationship with Russia, whilst still pursuing EU and NATO membership (which had been written into Georgia’s constitution). Saakashvili was charged with embezzlement and meddling with judicial process, and fled to Ukraine.
He enthusiastically supported the 2014 Maidan revolution and there is some suspicion that “former senior [Georgian] government officials” were instrumental in procuring snipers for the shootings which led to the fall of the Yanukovych government. Saakashvili took Ukrainian citizenship, and was subsequently appointed as Governor of Odessa. This did not last long - he resigned, citing his “fury at rampant corruption”, and attempted to start a new (more pro-Western) political movement. He was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship and moved to western Europe, although he continued to agitate against the Yanukovych government outside and inside Ukraine, despite being banned (he was deported more than once). He returned to Ukraine when Zelensky won the 2019 election, and his citizenship was restored.
Saakashvili at this point renounced any ambitions in Ukrainian politics. Then, in October 2021, in a surprising move, he returned to Georgia, knowing that he would face prison for his previous convictions in absentia. He remains imprisoned to this day, a totem for the West but largely ignored in Georgia itself.
Georgia’s most prominent Euro-Atlanticist voice is now the President, Salome Zourabichvili. Born in France, she studied at the elite civil service school Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), and then (like Saakashvili) at Columbia University with Brzezinski. Her career in the French diplomatic service included a posting to NATO, before being appointed as France’s ambassador to Georgia at the time of the Rose Revolution. Saakashvili appointed her as his government’s first Foreign Minister (she was still paid by the French government at the time), but she was sacked the following year. She has since stayed in Georgian politics, and was elected as President (a largely ceremonial role) in 2018.
It is clear than western involvement in Georgian politics is deep.
Election dividing lines
GD has chosen two principal issues as dividing lines with the West. First is the Foreign Agents Law (known by its local opponents, and painted in the West as the “Russian Law”). This requires that foreign-backed NGOs who receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad register as “agents of foreign influence”; it does not ban them or their funding, but merely requires them to be disclosed. The NGO sector in Georgia is vast: it is estimated that 25,000 NGOs are registered and that 90% of the funding of the sector comes from abroad. Opponents claim that it is inspired by a similar law which has been operative in Russia for over a decade, and that transparency somehow discredits their operations as by highlighting their foreign funding. The Government initially introduced the law last year, leading to street protests in Tbilisi and a veto from Zourabishvili. GD backed down for a year and then reintroduced the bill, this time overturning (perfectly constitutionally) the presidential veto.
Secondly, in September GD introduced a “Family Values” law, which bans same-sex marriage, adoption by same-sex couples, outlaws transitioning and provides for restrictions on the portrayal of LGBT people and issues in the media. Unlike the Foreign Agents law, this is substantive, and again has been vetoed by Zourabishvili. The murder of a transgender model the day after the law was passed has been presented by the West as linked, despite the fact that it appears to have been the result of a personal quarrel.
Despite the protests in the capital, the heavy presence of foreign NGOs is not universally popular. This report (by a pro “civil society” perspective) refers to only 23% of the Georgian population as trusting the sector. And regarding the Family Values bill, Georgia is still a traditional Christian country, where the Church still has considerable influence. GD polling claims that over 90% of the population are in favour of the law; whilst this may be seen as propaganda it is noteworthy that opposition parties are keeping quiet about the issue in the election.
GD is doubling down on irritating the West, and the West is biting. Biden disbarred prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze from a meeting at the UN General Assembly; the UK has halted the "strategic dialogue” on security issues. EU accession has been frozen. Western messaging about the forthcoming election could not be more blatant: this for example is a summary for just one day of the campaign, featuring interventions by the US ambassador, the State Department, the Council of Europe (and the parliamentary assembly thereof), the UNAIDS programme, and various NGOs, all (more or less subtly) briefing against the GD government.
Zourabishvili has not aligned herself with any one of the several opposition parties, but is instead - already - calling for a “technical government” to “restore people’s trust in politics”; it would be a wonderfully European solution. She even presents herself as the “voice of the people”, despite the fact that her Georgian language skills have caused comment.
The opposition parties are divided, and not all back her plan. The composition of the new parliament will be complex, particularly as parties need to reach a de minimis level of support of 5% to be represented. All commentators expect GD to be the largest party; it will be surprising if this is not followed by street protests against “democratic backsliding” as the West would have it represented.
No less an organisation as Chatham House here call for a second colour revolution in Tbilisi: “But if the manipulation by the incumbency is heavy, people will likely take to the streets in protest, as in April this year – and in the 2003 Rose Revolution. Regime change via popular revolution shows political immaturity but the Georgian people may feel it is the only way they can have their views represented and their ambitions realised.”
The South Caucasian Switch
At this point we need to consider why this country of 3.7 million is of interest to the West and to Russia, and what it may tell us about wider issues.
It is customary for Western narratives to present Russia as reflexively attempting to exert control over all of the former Soviet republics as its natural “sphere of influence”. I do not believe this to be the case. Russia has been (for example) relaxed about Western investment in Kazakhstan, and has abandoned its interests in its former ally Armenia in Artsakh. Georgia is not Ukraine; Russia need not fear military invasion across the Great Caucasus chain. What Georgia does have, however, is a long border with the largely Muslim, ethnically complex, and potentially troublesome republics that constitute her southern flank. Putin, of course, rose to power in the second Chechen war, and is all too aware that the leader of the rebel Chechen (Ichkerian) faction Akhmed Zakaraev is based in London under the protection of special forces.
At the same time, the West has found a new avenue to exploit inww we pvb the South Caucasus: a newly-friendly pro-Western government in Armenia, fresh from military defeat to Azerbaijan over the breakaway former Nagorno-Karabagh (the former self-declared Republic of Artsakh) in 2020, which was finally ethnically cleansed of its 120,000 Armenians a year ago. The Pashinyan regime in Yerevan has responded by signalling that is looking to leave the (Russian led) CSTO, and widen defence and other links with the West, looking to “normalise” links with its otherwise hostile neighbours, Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Western interests have spotted a new route with a more willing partner. The transport route known as the Middle Corridor - from Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and onto the West through Turkey - has previously run through Georgia (well illustrated by the oil and gas pipelines which run from Baku, past Tbilisi and then into Turkey). The more natural route may, in future, cut directly across southern Armenia; a route contemplated in the (somewhat laughably) called “Corridor of Peace” proposed by the Pashinyan regime in Yerevan.
GD’s election posters illustrate side-by-side scenes from Ukraine and Georgia: bombed flat versus booming. The message “Choose Peace” has further angered the West. Both GD and Russia are floating some kind of “normalising” relations with Georgia’s breakaway regions, as a method of saving face for Tbilisi. But this is also a battle for the soul of a country, as well as its geopolitical orientation and material interest. The fact that the West has been blind to this may well end up losing it altogether.