The Great Retrenchment
Speculative thoughts on Russia's strategy
In this post I will attempt to present an understanding some aspects of Russia’s total strategy, which are somewhat different to the normal readings - not just the regime narrative of “When Russian tanks roll westward”, but neither aligning with Russian apologists. It is speculative; various parts may or may not be correct; but they are, I believe, overlooked.
By “total strategy”, I shall borrow Correlli Barnett’s definition:
Strategy conceived as encompassing all the factors relevant to preserving or extending the power and prosperity of a human group in the face of rivalry from other human groups… From this standpoint, a topic like religion, for example, appears in a perhaps surprising light as a strategic factor of no less significance than first-line air strength.1
The great repatriation
Firstly, at the risk of boring you, and with apologies for this platform’s lack of ability to present tables2, I want to run though some basic statistics. Here is the total GDP (in nominal dollars, per IMF estimates) and GDP per capita for the former Soviet Union countries:
Russia: 1,862,470 (13,006)
Ukraine: 173,413 (4,596)
Belarus: 68,864 (7,447)
Estonia: 41,799 (28,333)
Latvia: 46,668 (21,851)
Lithuania: 79,427 (24,827)
Georgia: 30,023 (6,628)
Armenia: 24,540 (7,014)
Azerbaijan: 77,392 (7,530)
Kazakhstan: 259,292 (11,243)
Turkmenistan: 81,822 (8,508)
Uzbekistan: 90,392 (2,255)
Tajikistan: 11,816 (1,054)
Kyrgyzstan: 12,681 (1,607)
And here are estimates of population of those countries, currently and compared to 1991, the year of independence:
Russia: 1991 population 148m; 2022 146m. 1.4% decline.
Ukraine: 1991 51.9m; 2023: 34.7m. (2021: 41.1m). 33.1% decline
Belarus: 1991 10.2m; 2023 9.2m. 9.8% decline
Estonia: 1991 1.56m; 2023 1.37m. 12.2% decline
Latvia: 1991 2.66m; 2023 1.88m. 29.3% decline
Lithuania: 1991 3.7m; 2022 2.83m. 23.5% decline
Georgia: 1991 5.45m; 2022 3.69m. 32.3% decline.
Armenia: 1991 3.6m; 2033 3.0m. 16.7% decline
Azerbaijan: 1991 7.27m; 2022 10.2m. 40% increase
Kazakhstan: 1991 16.4m; 2022 19.8m. 20.7% increase
Uzbekistan: 1991 20.9m; 2022 36m. 72.2% increase
Turkmenistan: 1991 3.77m; 2022 7.1m. 88.3% increase
Tajikistan: 1991 5.43m; 2020 9.51m. 75.1,% increase
Kyrgyzstan: 1991 4.46m; 2022 7.04m. 58.8% increase
These population estimates need some notes: The numbers for Georgia reflect the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; without this the decline in population (from 1994 numbers) reduces to 25%. (Still…) And the Ukraine figures, before the war and the mass refugee displacement, were lower (in 2021) at 20.8%. Turkmenistan’s statistics are probably the least reliable, but are not out of kilter. Russia we will look at below.
The following points stand out:
The sheer scale of the economy of Russia compared to any other state of the FSU
Russia remains wealthier than any other state, save the Baltics
All of the Christian former republics are suffering population decline. All of the Muslim former republics are booming
The EU-aligned former republics have suffered significantly more in this regard, as free movement (for the Baltics) and aspiration (for the Georgians) have added to the problems of low fertility rates.
We need to unpack the population numbers for Russia. From 2014, the figures include Crimea, and from 2014 to 2015 the population jumps by 2.5 million. (The population of Ukraine in 2014 was (2.4 million, including 1.5 million ethnic Russians; so this would account for most, but not all, of the increase - particularly given the likely departure of an number of the ethnic Ukrainians.)
Population size, of course, is one of the basic factors of total strategy. What Russia has managed to do - really rather successfully - is draw in (mostly) ethnic Russians from the other former republics, and it has been able to do so partly because its relative wealth remains higher than the other republics (except for the Baltics). The most stark case is that of Kazakhstan; ethnic Kazakhs were actually a minority in their country at independence. During the 1990s alone, 2.6 million left the country, the majority (1.7 million) directly for Russia3. The ethnic Russian population has reduced by a further 1.5 million since, part of which will also accounted for by emigration.
Russia’s other population conundrum is that it truly is a multiethnic empire, albeit one where Russians are overwhelmingly dominant. Ethnic Russians accounted for 81.5% of the Federation in 1989, and the Russian repatriation has been key to keeping this stable - it is now 80.9% Other significant ethnic groups with their population share are Tatars 3.6% (1989: 3.8%), Chechens 1.3% (0.6%), Bashkirs 1.2% (0.9%), Chuvash 0.8% (1.2%) and Avars 0.8% (0.4%). Of course, all of these groups except the Chuvash are predominantly Muslim; the fertility divergence between the Christian and Muslim segments is as marked inside Russia itself as between the independent republics.
The Great Repatriation is even more remarkable in the light of the fact that 1.6 million Jews have left Russia since the Soviet Union collapsed (the aliyah).
Russia’s other strategy to counter its demographic problems has been to pursue a liberal immigration policy alongside “guest worker” programmes. The latter are mainly from the central Asian "Stans”.
My first major conclusion about the Ukraine War is therefore: it is a continuation of the strategy of repatriation by other means. We can only speculate as to how important this factor is compared to, say, rational security concerns. We’ll come back to the Ukraine war later.
The tragedy of Artsakh
Let’s look at another aspect of total strategy that is usually misread, at least until after the event: the illusion of Russian “influence” over its former republics.
The defining event - the “tell” if you like - in Russia’s policy prior to the invasion of Ukraine was the 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia/Artsakh (the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, under ethnic Armenian control since the first war following the collapse of the Soviet Union). Recall the relevant facts: using Turkish Bayraktar drones, the Azerbaijani forces developed military superiority within days; Russia stayed on the sidelines until a point of maximum instability, with Azerbaijan having taken Shushi (occupying the heights overlooking the capital Stepanakert); a which point a truce was agreed with Russian troops supervising what can only be seen as a temporary peace.
We must ask the question: why did Russia not intervene before? Why did it intervene then? Why did Azerbaijan accept it?
Clearly, the strategy of the 2020 ceasefire was only ever meant to be a temporary one, and it unthinkable that this was not agreed between the parties beforehand.
Next, two days before the Ukraine invasion was launched, Russia and Azerbaijan signed a new, enhanced treaty of military co-operation. (It was signed at 20:20 on 22/2/2022; Aliyev is a superstitious fellow4.)
If the 2020 war went largely ignored in the West, silence reigned when Aliyev tightened the noose and blockaded the access corridor between Armenia proper and Artsakh. Russian “peacekeepers” stood by as the situation worsened for nine months, until the situation became untenable, and the entire population of Artsakh crossed the border. This was a true ethnic cleansing.
Russia abandoned Armenia brutally. Most “traditional” reads were that Russia would benefit from keeping the conflict frozen for the sake of “influence” and boots on the ground. Russia has sold dominance in the South Caucasus to Turkey for her wider goals. Of course, keeping Turkey on side (or at least helpfully neutral) with the Ukraine war ongoing is important, but I posit a wider reason later.
Armenia remains under threat. The immediate issue is that Azerbaijan seeks a transit corridor to its exclave of Nakhichevan - the “Zangezur corridor”. And this would be more than just reopening a railway line. There is the real possibility that Azerbaijan is actively eying Armenian territory: regime rhetoric goes as far as referring to Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan”, and threatening “rights of return” for Azeris. Such a corridor would, of course, provide a land link from Turkey to Azerbaijan, and the Caspian and beyond.
Faced with Russian abandonment, the West has eagerly looked to fill the gap, particularly France and the US. EU observers now man the borders of Syunik (the southernmost part of the country) and the US army exercises with their Armenian counterparts. Prime Minister Pashinyan is driving a very different outlook for Armenian foreign policy; whilst Russian bases are still in the country, and being almost entirely dependent for her energy needs. Pashinyan’s partner frolics with Mrs Zelensky in Kiev. And yet Russia remains surprisingly quiet, other than the odd grumble.
In the (possibly apocryphal) words of Henry Kissinger: it may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal.
Misha and the cuckoo president
For the better part of two decades, Georgian politics has been split between the idealistic drive to accede to NATO and the EU, and the realistic position of its geographical strategy. The key figures are ex-PM Mikhail Saakashviili and the billionaire behind the current ruling Georgian Dream party, Bidzina Ivanishvili.
It’s worth a brief detour to the extraordinary career of “Misha”. Saakashvili was elected in 2004, following the “Rose Revolution” which deposed the Shevardnadze government, with, (no comment) a 96% vote in his favour. Staunchly pro-Western, the immediate response was for the breakaway regions of Georgia -Abkhazia and South Ossetia - to increase their drive for independence (or at least, Russian protection). The Bucharest Summit in 2008, at which Georgia (along with Ukraine) was offered a path to NATO membership, brought matters to a war footing: South Ossetian and Georgian hostilities brought Russian intervention; a brief campaign saw the occupation of Gori (Stalin’s birthplace) and some shelling of Tbilisi itself before a ceasefire agreement by which Russia recognised the breakaway republics, and kept peacekeeping forces in them.
Saakashvili remained in power, with increasing opposition, until 2012. The new, more Russian-sympathetic government of Ivanishvili (Georgia’s richest man, who made his money in Russia) pressed charges of embezzlement and meddling with judicial process against Saakashvili, who fled his homeland for a decade.
Saakashvili’s next move was in Ukraine. He enthusiastically supported the 2014 Maidan revolution (and there is some suspicion that he was instrumental in some of the events), took Ukrainian citizenship, and was subsequently appointed as Governor of Odessa. This did not last long - he resigned, citing corruption, and attempted to start a new (more pro-Western) political movement. He was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship, living in the West until Zelensky won the 2019 Ukrainian election, and his citizenship was restored.
Saakashvili at this point renounced any ambitions in Ukrainian politics. Then, in October 2021, in a surprising move, he returned to Georgia, to face his historic charges, prison and hunger strike. Saakashvili’s return stepped up the pro-Western agenda, at great cost to him.
The other strange actor in the mix is the President, Salome Zourabichvili. Born in France, she held a role in the Saakashvili cabinet, and then served France’s ambassador to Georgia, She studied at the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), and began a master's program at Columbia University in New York in the 1972, taking courses with Zbigniew Brzezinski. (At this point, if not before, eyebrows should be raising.) She is now the most prominent Euro-Atlanticist voice in the country; although Georgian Dream are at least nominally in favour too.
Ivanishvili is routinely portrayed as a Putin-aligned oligarch, the power behind the lesser figureheads of his party. He has recently announced a return to front line politics, possibly to dodge EU requirements for “deoligarchisation” in the Georgian political scene. (I’m sorry to inflict that horrible word on you, but that is the EU term.) There is no doubt that Georgian Dream takes a more “realist” position regarding Russia, despite the fact that Russia backs the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
I don’t think we’re seeing anything other than an old-fashioned struggle for influence between Russia and the West here, with some successful pushback from Russia. So why is Russia interested given what I said earlier with regard to Armenia? That lies, I think, less in the geographical importance of Georgia (even if she were a NATO member, it’s not as if the Georgian Miliary Highway across the High Caucasus would be a real military threat to Russia). The answer is surely that Russia wants to prevent the presence of a rival power on her southern flank who could reignite ethno-religious conflict among the growing population of the North Caucasus. Consider, for example, the rebel Chechen (Ichkerian) leader Akhmed Zakayev, who is based in London with the protection of the British state, and has been active in public in Ukraine during the war. Putin clearly believes that CIA-supported Islamic fundamentalism is a risk, from the Chechen wars to today.
The other key to Georgia’s importance is the Baku-Tbilsi-Ceyhan pipeline (and the gas pipeline taking a similar route to Kars) through which Azerbaijan transits oil from the Caspian to the West. Russia’s occupation of South Ossetia provides a base just a short distance from the pipeline, with the obvious threat that carries. And yet Georgia profits little from the pipeline: it has no - not a jot - of ownership (principally BP and the Azeri state firm SOCAR); transit fees are estimated at about $62m pa. By contrast, Georgian wine exports are $400m pa - most of which traditionally went to Russia.
Alongside all of this is the relationship between Georgia and Armenia, which is not exactly the sort of Christian fellowship of brothers you may expect. In fact, Georgia has been supportive of Azerbaijan in the military actions of the last few years: by allowing arms supply flights from Turkey and Israel through its airspace (for obvious reasons, this is the only route) and indeed blocking at times those from Russia. It’s possible that what we are in the early stages of witnessing a a switch in the alignment of these two states: as Armenia seeks western protection and Pashinyan attempts to normalise relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Georgia’s utility reduces to the West and allows Russian influence to grow.
Of course, the prospect of European cash and NATO protection is valuable to Georgia, but will it ever be realised? (Both organisations happily use the strategy of the infinite waiting room.) Would it be possible for Russia to “buy” a newly friendly Georgia from grasp of the West? Would it even be conceivable for Russia to retreat from South Ossetia or Abkhazia? The latter seems highly unlikely, particularly as Russia is building a major naval fleet at Ochamchira. But could a friendly Georgian government be “allowed” to retake South Ossetia (whose population is less than half of Artsakh)?
It’s worth keeping an eye on Georgia in this election year. If Ivanishvili consolidates his position, it will be a move to drive the cuckoos from the nest. This is certainly not as a prediction, merely a possibility: we may see a geopolitical switcheroo in the South Caucasus.
Multipolarity and the Middle Corridor
The border with Kazakhstan is Russia’s longest (indeed, it is the second longest border in the world). The situation here is therefore very different to the Caucasus: there is no way in which Russia could allow Western military penetration (direct or indirect) into Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan, as the numbers I started with show, is also the most significant economic power of the former Soviet states, home as she is to a substantial natural resource base, particularly oil and uranium. Kazakhstan accounts for 45% of current world uranium production.
Yet, there have been considerable moves to pull Kazakhstan towards a more Western-facing polity in recent years. It is well known that no less a figure than Tony Blair was a long-time adviser to ex-president Nazarbayev; but he also employed Portland Communications, home of key Blair insiders Alastair Campbell and Jonathan Powell too5. Foreign direct investment in the country since independence has skewed heavily western: more than half from the EU (the Netherlands and France in particular), 15% from the US, and 5% from the UK - the same as China. Russia appears to have been relaxed about this, despite Kazakhstan being a member of both the SCO and CSTO.
(Against this, the rapid intervention by Russian forces when protests against the new president Tokayev in January 2022 need to be explained. The judgement at the time that this was an incipient colour revolution quickly suppressed by Russia seems overdone: Tokayev has not openly supported Russia’s Ukraine war. My guess is that the January situation was a sudden panic by an inexperienced newcomer continuing the broad policies of his predecessor, and perhaps unsure at that stage of the loyalty of the army. My guess is that this was just a internal factional squabble, and Russia’s prime interest was stability.)
Alongside lies the question of the “Middle Corridor”: the much-vaulted alternative transit route for goods avoiding Russia, but connecting China to the West via Kazakhstan, across the Caspian to Baku, and then on to Turkey. Again, Europe is backing this: recently a €10 billion transport investment fund was announced.
We need therefore to question why Russia has allowed such free integration of the West into Kazakhstan. Firstly, there is of course the position of China: it is inconceivable that Chinese interests would allow anything so crass as a Russian military occupation of the country. But I believe there is another issue at play: that Russia is actively supportive of the rise of the Turkic states as independent powers.
Russia takes multipolarity seriously. Consider: if the word was to split into truly rival camps in a maximalist Cold War II, she would be little more than a subordinate partner to China. Russia will be able to leverage power much better in a truly multipolar world. The integration of the Organisation of Turkic States suits this agenda perfectly; although given the geographies involved this will be co-operative and economic, rather than formal. This also sheds light on the abandonment of Armenia.
There is also the simple question of Turkey itself. Turkey is at best a half-hearted member of NATO (remember it did launch a invasion of a fellow member - but that’s not talked about in polite NATO circles). And membership of the European Union is not going to happen. Turkey has certainly taken every opportunity to play both sides in the Ukraine war. Encouraging Turkey’s journey steadily further from the Western sphere is certainly in Russia’s interest.
I think we are really seeing a clash of ideologies here: the liberal West believing (yet again) that integration of the Central Asia with investment and soft power will bring them to “our side”, whereas illiberal Russia sees the realities of multipolarity more clearly.
Putin the Machiavellian
“It is necessary to freeze Russia, if only slightly, to prevent it rotting.”6
The anti-liberal Tsarist thinker Konstantin Leontiev (1831-91) - elsewhere quoted by Putin - was referring to matters cultural rather than strategy; seeking to isolate Russia from the West to stop the rot of liberalism. It is well known that it Putin fully agrees with the necessity to guard Russia from the moral decay of the west. This is, I believe, his honestly held opinion rather than rhetoric, but the issue is irrelevant in Machiavellian terms. Orthodoxy is a powerful political formula, which Putin skilfully manages to combine with a imperial multiculturalism of the minorities of the Russian Federation.
Elsewhere, though, Putin’s rhetoric can be more slippery, and we need to be able to distinguish between “formal” and “real” meanings, using James Burnham’s terms.
Consider, for example, Putin’s speech to the World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2021 (the full text is here, and is worth reading). After setting out the problems of (implicitly) the West, whilst paying lip service to the WEF talking points of climate, globalisation, pandemics and so on, he sets out a striking economic statement:
An increasing role of the state in the socioeconomic sphere at the national level obviously implies greater responsibility and close interstate interaction when it comes to issues on the global agenda.
Calls for inclusive growth and for creating decent standards of living for everyone are regularly made at various international forums. This is how it should be, and this is an absolutely correct view of our joint efforts.
(Incidentally, this is in accordance with Leontiev’s views, who welcomed a socialist-feudal future under an enlightened Tsar.) He then cleverly links the economic problems of the West with monopolism, particularly of technology companies; before moving on to this:
Obviously, the era linked with attempts to build a centralised and unipolar world order has ended. To be honest, this era did not even begin. A mere attempt was made in this direction, but this, too, is now history. The essence of this monopoly ran counter to our civilisation’s cultural and historical diversity.
The reality is such that really different development centres with their distinctive models, political systems and public institutions have taken shape in the world. Today, it is very important to create mechanisms for harmonising their interests to prevent the diversity and natural competition of the development poles from triggering anarchy and a series of protracted conflicts.
To achieve this we must, in part, consolidate and develop universal institutions that bear special responsibility for ensuring stability and security in the world and for formulating and defining the rules of conduct both in the global economy and trade.
I have mentioned more than once that many of these institutions are not going through the best of times. We have been bringing this up at various summits. Of course, these institutions were established in a different era. This is clear. Probably, they even find it difficult to parry modern challenges for objective reasons. However, I would like to emphasise that this is not an excuse to give up on them without offering anything in exchange, all the more so since these structures have unique experience of work and a huge but largely untapped potential. And it certainly needs to be carefully adapted to modern realities. It is too early to dump it in the dustbin of history. It is essential to work with it and to use it.
Naturally, in addition to this, it is important to use new, additional formats of cooperation. I am referring to such phenomenon as multiversity. Of course, it is also possible to interpret it differently, in one’s own way. It may be viewed as an attempt to push one’s own interests or feign the legitimacy of one’s own actions when all others can merely nod in approval. Or it may be a concerted effort of sovereign states to resolve specific problems for common benefit. In this case, this may refer to the efforts to settle regional conflicts, establish technological alliances and resolve many other issues, including the formation of cross-border transport and energy corridors and so on and so forth.
The “real” meaning behind this, the key passage of the speech is: “I am happy to pretend that I share your values, but Russia is Russia. Work with us, and factor us in, but things need to change.” The threat implied, in the light of the war that started a little over a year later, is also apparent.
What are we to make of Putin’s rhetoric about the Ukraine war?
Firstly, the formal term of “Denazification”. We all know that there are some unpleasant types which make up some sections of the Ukrainian forces, and wider society. But “Nazi” in a Russian context is really just an equation for “anti-Russian”, particularly when applied to Ukraine. (Perhaps the shared values of the Putin and Western regimes are not so far apart after all.) Indeed, another thinker Putin has quoted, Ivan Ilyin, and whose grave he consecrated in 2009, literally became a Nazi and fled to Germany. Denazification is not code for taking out every last Ukrainian with a Wolfsangel tattoo, but rather limiting threat from Ukraine.
Secondly, the “Historical” and “Spiritual” unity of Russia and Ukraine. Putin likes to show his deep knowledge of history, as the recent Tucker Carlson interview showed. But this knowledge also demonstrates his rootedness in realism: “A ruler should read historical works, especially for the light they shed on the actions of eminent men: to find out how they waged war, to discover the reasons for their victories and defeats, in order to avoid reverses and achieve conquests.”7 But realism must rear its head here: the war has done more than anything else to forge a Ukrainian identity in the majority of the country that remains under Kiev’s control. Putin is, I believe, setting out a long-term goal that anticipates a China/Taiwan, or North/South Korea frozen conflict. It is certain that the prospect of controlling a restive population of maybe 30 million would be an impossible drain on Russia’s resources; this is not Chechnya, and Putin is not stupid.
Thirdly, consider this passage from his article:
Of course, inside the USSR, borders between republics were never seen as state borders; they were nominal within a single country, which, while featuring all the attributes of a federation, was highly centralized – this, again, was secured by the CPSU's leading role. But in 1991, all those territories, and, which is more important, people, found themselves abroad overnight, taken away, this time indeed, from their historical motherland.
That this is simply formal is demonstrated by the case of Artsakh. Putin is a realist through-and-through.
Finally, consider the final paragraph of the essay:
Today, these words may be perceived by some people with hostility. They can be interpreted in many possible ways. Yet, many people will hear me. And I will say one thing – Russia has never been and will never be ”anti-Ukraine“. And what Ukraine will be – it is up to its citizens to decide.
That doesn’t need decoding: Russia is perfectly willing to negotiate.
My last point is a simple one, and underlies everything that I am setting out here: Putin the Machiavellian is well aware of imperial overreach.
Conclusions
The notion of launching a war to increase your population is counterintuitive, not to say morally repugnant. For the avoidance of doubt, I view the Ukraine war as a deep tragedy, and all parties to it deserve criticism. But, in the light of the increasing reluctance of the United States in particular to provide the massive ongoing support to keep the war going, and in an election year, some settlement is surely coming - indeed I made a prediction that it may be as soon as this year here.
Putin’s strategy in the early stages of the war also makes sense under this framework: an early strike at Kiev was a gamble to see if the regime would collapse quickly. When it did not, the switch to much more limited objectives was undertaken. Kill- and casualty-ratios are of course central to any military conflict; but they have been much in evidence here. Securing a defensible land bridge to Crimea was important, but the taking of territory per se has been less important than degrading Ukrainian fighting reserves, and Western appetites, until a deal (temporary surely, but a deal) can be struck. Most pro-Russian Ukrainians are already likely in the occupied territories, Russia herself or overseas. The one big question remains as it has from the start: will Russia seek to take the entire Black Sea littoral to Odessa before a truce is struck?
I have not sought to cover here the many other aspects of total strategy, such as Russia’s drive for control of natural resources, the economic effects sanctions on Russia and the West, or the military aspect of Russia’s geostrategy: they are covered elsewhere and I don’t dissent from the more standard reading of them. I have simply tried to elucidate some other, overlooked aspects.
To summarise, I believe:
The Ukraine war it is a continuation of the strategy of repatriation by other means
A geopolitical switcheroo in the South Caucasus is a possibility
Multipolarity is central to Russia’s strategy, and is actively supportive of the rise of the Turkic states as independent powers
Putin is a Machiavellian, and is well aware of imperial overreach
Russia is not rolling westward, or retreating: she is retrenching.
“The Collapse of British Power”, Corelli Barnett, p ix
Or, I’m just a boomer
“Dark Shadows”, Joanna Lillis, p 135.
https://president.az/en/articles/view/55498
“Dark Shadows”, p 74
Quoted in “The New Leviathans”, John Grey, p. 59
“ The Prince”, Niccolo Machiavell, p53 (Cambridge University Press, 2009 edition)